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Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson: Interpretation of
Oil and Gas Lease Habendum Clauses in Texas and Why
Oklahoma Should Maintain Its Divergent Approach to
Keep Leases Alive*
I. Introduction
The relevant clause of an oil and gas lease which sets the lease’s duration is
known as the habendum clause.1  Typically, the habendum clause divides the
lease into a primary term and a secondary term.2  The  primary term is a fixed
period during which the lessee (most often, an oil and gas company) has the
right to explore or drill for oil and gas on the leased premises but has no
obligation to do so.3  During the secondary term, the lease and its associated
rights are further extended, but subject to the lessee’s obtaining, and then
maintaining, production.4
The definition of the word “production” would appear to be self-explanatory.
Nevertheless, two major oil and gas jurisdictions, Texas and Oklahoma, have
differing views as to what constitutes “production” for habendum clause
purposes.  As one commentator states:
As in all contracts, the terms used are subject to definition and usage
guidelines, and those guidelines vary from state to state.  A
dichotomy in the interpretation of oil and gas leases has developed
in Texas and Oklahoma, the two leading jurisdictions in oil and gas
law.  Texas favors a strict application of lease language, while
Oklahoma has adopted a more equitable posture.5
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6. See Smith v. Marshall Oil Corp., 2004 OK 10, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 830, 833; Stewart v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, ¶ 5, 604 P.2d 854, 857; State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land
Office v. Carter Oil Co. of W. Va., 1958 OK 289, ¶ 36, 336 P.2d 1086, 1093-94; Clifton v.
Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (Tex. 1959); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942).
7. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267, 269-70 (Tex. 1960); Clifton, 325 S.W.2d
at 691; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
8. See Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 1994 OK 23, ¶¶ 8-10, 869 P.2d 323, 326-27; McVicker
v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 1958 OK 49, ¶ 6, 322 P.2d 410, 413-14; Geyer Bros. Equip. Co.
v. Standard Res., 2006 OK CIV APP 924, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 563, 566; Danne v. Texaco Exploration
& Prod., Inc., 1994 OK CIV APP 138, ¶¶ 22-23, 883 P.2d 210, 217.
9. 2 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.6 (1989)
(distinguishing between oil wells and gas wells because gas, unlike oil, cannot be economically
stored and gas wells are often reasonably shut-in to await a market).
10. 94 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Tex. 2002) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 558.
12. Id. at 558-59.
13. Id.
14. Id.
Both jurisdictions concur that “production in paying quantities” is required,6 but
only Texas courts view production in paying quantities as requiring actual
physical production and marketing.7  In contrast, Oklahoma courts hold that the
production requirement in the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease requires
only that the well be “capable” of producing in paying quantities (with the
marketing of oil and gas being a separate matter governed by the implied
covenant to market within a reasonable time).8  This “capability rule” applies
in Oklahoma to both oil and gas wells, while some states adopt a “capability
rule” only applicable to gas wells.9
Although actual production is physically quantifiable, “capability” is an
elusive concept that can be difficult for courts to define.  Though Texas
historically has rejected the “capability rule” in interpreting typical habendum
clauses—clauses using “is produced” language—in Anadarko Petroleum Co.
v. Thompson, when confronted with contractual language that extended a lease
as long as oil and gas “is or can be produced,”10 the Texas Supreme Court could
not avoid construing “capability.”11  In doing so, the court offered a relatively
detailed description of what is required for a well to be capable of producing in
paying quantities.12  This culminated in a result requiring operators to be able
to “turn on” their wells to begin production at any given moment to have them
regarded by the courts as “capable” of production.13  The court’s construction
of “capable,” in conformity with its strict “actual production” general rule,
places significant requirements on oil and gas lessees to maintain a well
“capable” of production.14  In contrast, Oklahoma courts have not specifically
defined what is necessary to have an oil or gas well capable of production in
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15. See generally Pack, 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323; McVicker, 1958 OK 49, 322 P.2d 410;
Geyer Bros., 2006 OK CIV APP 924, 140 P.3d 563; Danne, 1994 OK CIV APP 138, 883 P.2d
210.
16. A “typical” habendum clause used in both Oklahoma and Texas provides that the lease
is maintained as long as oil or gas “is produced” in paying quantities.  See infra note 20; see
also supra notes 1-9.  Oklahoma courts interpret this language to require capability of
production, while Texas courts require actual production.  See supra notes 1-9; see also infra
Part II.  The “atypical” habendum clause language allowing the lease to survive as long as oil
or gas “is or can be produced” clearly invokes the capability rule.  See supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.  
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
paying quantities.15  Oklahoma law interpreting habendum clauses under the
“capability rule” centers on equitable principles which will be undermined if
Oklahoma courts follow Texas’ path to a strict construction of “capable.”  For
this reason, Oklahoma should maintain a “capability rule” that balances the
equities between lessee and lessor and avoids the forfeiture of interests.
This note will examine the Texas Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the
“capability rule” for use in construing the atypical habendum clause in
Thompson16 through the lens of Oklahoma’s general application of the rule.
Part II will briefly consider Texas’ “actual production” rule and proceed to
more acutely analyze Oklahoma’s “capability rule” and the nuances in its
application.  Part III will consider the Thompson decision in greater detail,
including the atypical lease provision involved and factual background, the
holding, and the rationale behind the court’s limited definition of “capable.”
Part IV will discuss the implications a limited construction of “capable” would
have on Oklahoma’s general application of the “capability rule.”  This includes
a discussion of how such an interpretation would interfere with practical
considerations, impact the implied covenant to market, and alter the
interpretation of the cessation-of-production clause in Oklahoma.  Part IV will
also offer an argument for maintaining Oklahoma’s more relaxed, less
definitive “capability rule” to encourage oil and gas operations in the state and
support this vital industry.  This note will conclude in Part V.
II. Texas’ and Oklahoma’s Differing Views Regarding “Production”
Historically, Oklahoma and Texas courts have taken widely divergent views
on the interpretation of oil and gas lease habendum clauses.  Texas courts have
maintained an interpretation of the word “production” in leases that requires
actual, physical production of oil or gas.17  Examining why Texas courts strictly
construe what is necessary to make a well productive will offer insight into the
strict definition of “capable” adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in
Thompson.  Furthermore, a look into Oklahoma case law developing and
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18. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 23.26; see also Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107
S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
19. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 23.26; see also Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746.
20. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d at 748 (emphasis added).
21. See id.
22. Symonds, supra note 5, at 418-19 (noting, “As a result of the determinable nature of
the grant, the lessee’s failure to satisfy the production requirements of the lease will cause an
automatic termination of the lease.”).
23. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
24. 107 S.W.2d 746.
25. Id. at 747.
applying the “capability rule,” where production is satisfied by mere capability
of production, highlights the great differences in approach taken by these
jurisdictions.  Analyzing case law in Oklahoma and Texas also reveals the
interplay between satisfying the habendum clause and complying with the
implied covenant to market.  The formulation chosen for interpreting the
capability rule further impacts the interpretation of cessation-of-production
clauses.  This section reviews the relevant cases in these areas and provides a
framework for analyzing the impact a strict definition of “capable,” as adopted
by the Texas Supreme Court in Thompson, would have on Oklahoma oil and
gas law.
A. Texas’ “Actual Production” Rule
When considering the differences in Texas’ and Oklahoma’s interpretation
of the habendum clause in oil and gas leases, it is helpful to consider the nature
of the leasehold interest conveyed, which is an important source of
disagreement between these jurisdictions.  Texas uses the ownership-in-place
theory to classify the rights granted by an oil and gas lease.18  Under this theory,
courts generally view the interest granted by the lessor to the lessee as a fee
simple determinable in the oil and gas in place.19  It is seen as a fee simple
because it extends indefinitely “as long thereafter as oil or gas . . . is produced
in paying quantities.”20  However, it is determinable because certain limitations
can terminate the lease, such as failure to obtain production by the end of the
primary term or failure to maintain production in the secondary term.21  The
fee’s determinable nature calls for a strict construction of the habendum
clause.22  Accordingly, “satisfaction of an oil and gas lease in Texas requires not
only the discovery of a potentially profitable mineral formation, but also the
actual production and marketing of product from that formation.”23
An early case reflecting Texas’ strict interpretation of “production in paying
quantities” is Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill.24  In Barnhill, the well was
drilled within the relevant time frame and was discovered to have highly
productive potential.25  Unfortunately, this potential was for great volumes of
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26. Id.  Sour gas is “[n]atural gas contaminated with chemical impurities, notably hydrogen
sulphide or other sulphur compounds, which impart to the gas a foul odor.  Such compounds
must be removed before the gas can be used for commercial and domestic purposes.”  8
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 986 (2007).
27. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d at 748.
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 749.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. 337 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. 1960).
35. Id. at 268.
unmarketable sour gas.26  The habendum clause of the lease was typical,
providing for a five year primary term and extending “as long thereafter as oil
or gas, or either of them, is produced in paying quantities from the land by the
lessee.”27  Without discussion, the court found that “if oil or gas is not produced
from the land within the period of five years, the lease comes to an end.”28
While the court did not explicitly assert “actual production” as the rule in
Texas, this conclusion was implied throughout the decision and confirmed by
the addition of a requirement beyond actual production: marketing of gas.29
Although actual production was established, the lease was determined to be
expired because no market existed for the sour gas produced from the leased
premises.30  According to the court,
[the lessee] did not contract for a term which would depend upon
the possibility of procuring a market for the product at some date
subsequent to its express date of expiration.  The lease did not
provide that it should remain in force and effect for five years, and
as long thereafter as there may be prospects of a market for the
product, and it is not the duty of the courts to make contracts for
parties but only to construe such contracts as they make for
themselves.31
Therefore, the court construed the habendum clause language not only to
require actual production, but marketing as well.32  Although there is generally
imposed on the oil and gas lessee an “implied duty to market,” the breach of
which can result in the imposition of damages, the court in Barnhill seemed to
merge this duty into the requirements to satisfy the habendum clause and keep
the lease alive.33  More definitive answers about the “actual production” rule
were given in the 1960 case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid.34
In Reid, a well was drilled and found to be capable of producing gas in
paying quantities.35  However, the well was shut-in due to lack of marketing




39. 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
40. Reid, 337 S.W.2d at 269-70 (emphasis added).
41. Id.  
42. Id.  Also, the court denied a reasonable time to pay shut-in royalty payments in
accordance with a savings provision allowing such payments in lieu of actual production in the
lease.  Id. at 271.
43. Id. at 271-72. 
44. 107 S.W.2d 746.
45. 337 S.W.2d 267.
46. Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. App.
1993).
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 432 (citing RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.5, at 304
(2d ed. 1983)) (equating the satisfaction of a savings clause to “constructive production”).
infrastructure (i.e., pipelines).36  Thereafter, the lessee contracted with a pipeline
company to purchase the gas, the necessary pipelines were laid, and the well
began actually producing in paying quantities.37  Nevertheless, the lessor
rejected shut-in royalty payments and sued maintaining the lease had expired
when the well was shut-in.38  Reiterating the holding of Barnhill39 and stating
a proposition “that [has] been well established during the development of oil
and gas law in [Texas],” the Texas Supreme Court stated that “no matter how
great the potential production may be or how many million cubic feet of gas
may have been flared, there would be no production or production in paying
quantities unless there was an available market.”40  In other words, proffering
“lack of a market for oil and/or gas production” as an excuse at the expiration
of the primary term will not keep a lease alive in Texas.41  Furthermore, the
court denied a “reasonable time” to market the product, which the lessee may
have satisfied in this case.42  Thus, in accordance with the “actual production”
rule, production in paying quantities, as well as marketing of that product, was
strictly required to satisfy the habendum clause of the lease.43
Though application of the “actual production” rule to satisfy the habendum
clause became well-established in Texas through cases such as Barnhill44 and
Reid,45 years later in 1993, a Texas Court of Appeals was confronted with
defining “capability” for the purposes of construing a savings clause.46  In
Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., the lease
contained a “savings clause,”47 which is a provision that allows the lease to stay
alive without production, as defined in the habendum clause, if certain
requirements in the clause are met.48  Thus, actual production is generally
required to satisfy the typical habendum clause in Texas, but satisfaction of the
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49. Hydrocarbon, 861 S.W.2d at 433.  According to one source, a shut-in royalty clause
“permits the lessee to maintain or extend the lease, while there is no production because wells
capable of production have been shut-in, by paying royalties in lieu of production.”  TEX. JUR.
3D Oil and Gas § 205 (1995).  Effectively, such a clause “provides for substitute or contractual
method of production, which will maintain the lease in force and effect when a gas well is
drilled for the production from which no market exists . . . .”  Id.
50. Hydrocarbon, 861 S.W.2d at 433.
51. Id. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 434.
54. Id. at 434-35.
55. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002).
56. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960); Hydrocarbon, 861 S.W.2d 427;
savings clause serves as “constructive production” and would keep the lease
alive even if there were no actual production.  
In Hydrocarbon, the savings clause was in the form of a “shut-in royalties”
provision.49  This clause allowed the lease to stay alive if two requirements were
met.50  First, there must be a well “capable of producing gas” (maintaining that
“producing” is synonymous with “producing gas in paying quantities”), and
second, if that well is shut-in, a shut-in royalty payment must be paid.51  If both
requirements are met, the shut-in royalty clause serves as constructive actual
production.  Consequently, to satisfy the first requirement, the court had to
determine when a well was capable of production.  In doing so, the court held:
We believe that the phrase ‘capable of production in paying
quantities’ means a well that will produce in paying quantities if the
well is turned ‘on,’ and it begins flowing, without additional
equipment or repair.  Conversely, a well would not be capable of
producing in paying quantities if the well switch were turned ‘on,’
and the well did not flow, because of mechanical problems or
because the well needs rods, tubing, or pumping equipment.52
The well in question in Hydrocarbon was clearly not capable of production on
the date it was shut-in because the well casing and tubing were dysfunctional,
despite the operator’s failing efforts to swab the well and repair the problems.53
Thus, even without such a demanding definition of “capable,” this lease would
not have survived.54  Nevertheless, this strict definition became the foundation
of the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson, and is influential in
construing “capability” in a habendum clause.55
These Texas decisions demonstrate that the “actual production” rule is well-
established in the state to interpret habendum clauses and determine what is
necessary to keep a lease alive past its primary term and throughout the
secondary term.56  Thus, Texas requires not only actual production in paying
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Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
57. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267; Hydrocarbon, 861 S.W.2d 427; Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746.
58. HEMINGWAY, supra note 48, § 1.3.
59. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 23.23; see also Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145,
604 P.2d 854; Hunter v. Clarkson, 1967 OK 114, 428 P.2d 210.
60. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 23.23; see also Stewart, 1979 OK 145, 604 P.2d 854; Hunter,
1967 OK 114, 428 P.2d 210.
61. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 23.23; see also Stewart, 1979 OK 145, 604 P.2d 854; Hunter,
1967 OK 114, 428 P.2d 210.
62. Symonds, supra note 5, at 424.
63. See generally Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323; McVicker v.
Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 1958 OK 49, 322 P.2d 410; Geyer Bros. Equip. Co. v. Standard
Res., 2006 OK CIV APP 924, 140 P.3d 563; Danne v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 1994
OK CIV APP 138, 883 P.2d 210.
64. 1958 OK 49, 322 P.2d 410.
65. Id. ¶ 5, 322 P.2d at 412 (emphasis omitted).
quantities—as opposed to simply the capability of production needed in
Oklahoma—but also marketing to keep the lease alive.57
B. Oklahoma’s “Capability Rule”
Oklahoma’s interpretation of “producing” in the typical habendum clause is
strikingly different from Texas’ interpretation, stemming primarily from a
different view of the property interest conveyed by a lease.  Oklahoma uses an
exclusive-right-to-take theory as opposed to the ownership-in-place theory used
by Texas courts.58  Under exclusive-right-to-take, because the lessor does not
own the oil and gas in place, he or she cannot transfer it to the lessee.59  Thus,
the lessee cannot own the oil and gas in place either.60  Instead, the interest
transferred in the lease is a profit á prendre, or an irrevocable license which
vests upon discovery.  Actual production is not required;61 thus, Oklahoma
“merely requires a well capable of production . . . to satisfy the lessee’s
obligation.”62
In case after case, Oklahoma courts have applied the “capability rule”
without specifically defining “capability.”63  The cases discussed in this section,
however, reveal a “capability rule” favorable to the oil and gas industry and
considerably more relaxed than the “actual production” rule used in Texas.
In 1958, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided McVicker v. Horn, Robinson
& Nathan, adopting the “capability rule” as Oklahoma law.64  In McVicker, the
habendum clause allowed for a primary term of one year and for the lease to
continue “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from
said lands.”65  The lessor claimed the lease expired on its own terms because of
the lessee’s failure to produce gas from the leased land by October 31, 1954,
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66. Id. ¶ 2, 322 P.2d at 411.
67. Id. ¶ 5, 322 P.2d at 413.
68. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 322 P.2d at 414-15.
69. Id. ¶ 8, 322 P.2d at 414.
70. Id. ¶ 5, 322 P.2d at 412-13.
71. Id. ¶ 5, 322 P.2d at 413.
72. Id.
73. Id. 
74. Id. (quoting Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir.
1948)).
75. Id.
which was the end of the one-year primary term.66  The facts indicate, however,
that the lessee drilled a well on the leased premises and was actually drawing
gas to the surface and “reducing it to possession in a manner in which it could
be, but had not yet been, marketed.”67  The failure to market was not, as the
court found, related to the lessee’s lack of effort; rather, the circumstances
indicated that the lessee was diligently negotiating for a pipeline connection to
transport the available gas from the well and had reason to believe the
negotiations would be successful.68  Meanwhile, the well was shut-in to
maintain the product and await a market.69
The defendants’ primary argument was that extending the lease beyond its
primary term did not require “production” in the ordinary sense of the word,
claiming that to “produce” does not require “marketing” as the plaintiff
suggested.70  Though the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that Kansas
courts had required marketing to satisfy their definition of production, it refused
to include additional elements within the “production” requirement.71  The court
favored the defendants’ practical argument that gas could have been produced
in the ordinary sense (meaning actual production up the well bore and reduced
to usable possession), but without an available market it would have been a
complete waste and contrary to the interest of both the lessee and lessor.72  The
court restated this argument by writing, “They say they could have ‘produced’
gas from the leased premises, within the ordinary meaning of the word, if they
had not ‘shut in’ the well, but had left it open to waste its gaseous product into
the air.”73  The court cited a Tenth Circuit decision finding that “in the very
nature of the oil business . . . a reasonable time must intervene between the
completion of the drilling operations resulting in production and the ability to
market and sell the product of a well.”74  Importantly, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court indicated the word “produced” was not to be construed as requiring of the
lessee something beyond what is reasonable from the perspective of the oil and
gas industry.75
Later the same year, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided State ex rel.
Commissioners of the Land Office v. Carter Oil Co. of West Virginia, further
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76. 1958 OK 289, 336 P.2d 1086.
77. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 336 P.2d at 1089-90.
78. Id. ¶ 5, 336 P.2d at 1089 (quoting the lease in question).
79. Id. ¶ 15, 336 P.2d at 1091.
80. Id. ¶ 16, 336 P.2d at 1091-92.
81. Id. ¶ 16, 336 P.2d at 1092.
82. Id. ¶¶ 0-4, 336 P.2d at 1088-89.
83. Id. ¶ 22, 336 P.2d at 1092 (citing 64 OKLA. STAT. § 281 (1951)) (emphasis added).
84. Id. ¶ 5, 336 P.2d at 1089.
defining the “capability rule.”76  In this case, the Commissioners of the Land
Office executed an oil and gas lease of publicly-owned lands to a third-party,
which subsequently assigned the lease to the defendant oil company.77  The
lease’s habendum clause was in the typical form, stating that the lease would
continue “as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced in paying
quantities . . . .”78  The plaintiff/lessor claimed the company had conducted no
drilling operations on the leased premises before expiration of the primary
term.79  On the contrary, the lessee/oil company claimed “that a well producing
gas in paying quantities was completed on the unit prior to the expiration of the
term of its leases from the Commissioners,” but “there was no pipe line in the
area and it was impossible to market the gas.”80  Diligent efforts were
undertaken to find a market and one was eventually secured.81
The fact that mineral interests in public lands were leased introduces a
complication rendering this case more interesting to consider in combination
with the Thompson decision.82  The situation in Commissioners of the Land
Office was actually an inverse of Thompson.  The statute authorizing the
Commissioners of the Land Office to grant oil and gas leases of public lands
sets minimum requirements for the habendum clauses of such leases.
Particularly, the minimally-restrictive clause required by statute must have
provided that the lease would continue “for the term of five years and as long
thereafter as oil or gas may be produced therefrom in paying quantities.”83  The
Commissioners, however, went a step further, inserting the typical “is
produced” language.84  The court found:
“May be” as used in the statute connotes the possibility of
production in paying quantities.  In other words the minimum
statutory requirement prescribed would be in effect, the capability
to produce oil or gas in paying quantities within the primary term.
“Is” ordinarily means an objective fact.  Thus it is apparent that
in prescribing in the lease “as long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced therefrom in paying quantities” the commissioners went
beyond the minimum statutory restrictions hereinbefore detailed.
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85. Id. ¶¶ 25-27, 336 P.2d at 1092-93 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. Id. ¶ 42, 336 P.2d at 1094-95.
87. Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 336 P.2d at 1093.
88. Id. ¶ 28, 336 P.2d at 1093.
89. Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 336 P.2d at 1093. 
90. Id. ¶ 41, 336 P.2d at 1094.
91. Id. ¶ 42, 336 P.2d at 1094-95.
92. 1944 OK 299, 152 P.2d 923.
93. Id. ¶ 46, 336 P.2d at 1095 (citing Walden, 1944 OK 299, 152 P.2d 923).
94. Id. (citing McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 1958 OK 49, 322 P.2d 410).
95. Id. 
This being true and further since this provision “as long thereafter
as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities” is in common usage
in commercial oil and gas leases, it is necessary to look to our
decisions involving such commercial leases and determine what we
have held to be the meaning thereof, the commissioners’ lease never
having been before this court in regard thereto.85
Thus, the court had an opportunity to distinguish between “may be” and “is”
language in a habendum clause and find that “may be” denotes capability while
“is” does not.  This was not the result.86  The oil company contended, and the
Commissioners stipulated, that the oil company had completed a well capable
of producing in paying quantities before the expiration of the primary term and
had diligently searched for and obtained a market.87  The Commissioners,
however, did not feel capability was enough to satisfy the habendum clause and
argued the lease unambiguously required a completed well and marketed
production before expiration of the primary term.88  Thus, the court was directly
confronted with the decision of whether or not to adopt the “capability rule.”89
The Oklahoma Supreme Court refused the Commissioners’ rationale, stating
that the lease necessarily implied “the right to obtain a market and sell the
production therefrom after the period fixed for completion had expired.”90  The
court ruled that completion of a well capable of producing in paying quantities
extended the term of the lease.91  In reconciling this holding with prior rulings,
the court first considered Walden v. Potts,92 where it was held that production
means not only discovery, but also production in pursuance of the covenants
and purposes of the lease.93  Further, the court considered McVicker, where
production and marketing were distinguished and the court held that the lessee
was allowed a reasonable time after completion to comply with the implied
covenant to market.94  The decision to apply the “capability rule” in
Commissioners of the Land Office was an effort to “implement[] and
complement[]” these two decisions.95  Ultimately, the court adopted a
“capability rule” that allows the lessee to exercise the right granted to him in the
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96. Id. ¶ 46, 336 P.2d at 1095-96.
97. Id., ¶¶ 43-46, 336 P.2d at 1095.
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100. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002).
101. Lisa S. McCalmont, Note, Vanishing Rights of the Mineral Lessor:  The Pack v. Santa
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discussion in a later section of what they refer to as “the long-standing rule that the term
‘production’ as used in the habendum clause means ‘capable of producing in paying
quantities.’” See id. ¶ 5 n.1, 869 P.2d at 325 n.1.
primary term to complete a well producing in paying quantities “by allowing
a reasonable time after discovery . . . to acquire a market and thereafter
requiring the lessee to take and market the product . . . .”96  The court also
carefully distinguished the habendum clause “production” requirement with the
requirements imposed by the implied covenant to market, clarifying that the two
concepts are not merged in Oklahoma.97
While the decision effectively outlined the rationale behind the “capability
rule,”98 the court failed to describe with particularity what is necessary to have
a well “capable of producing in paying quantities.”  At a minimum, the court
indicated that a well needs to be successfully drilled on the leased premises;99
however, the court did not indicate whether capability requires the operator be
able to “flip the ‘on’ switch” and immediately procure oil and/or gas, as
required by the Thompson decision.100  Furthermore, though this case’s holding
only applied the “capability rule” to the primary term of the lease, the rule has
subsequently been extended to production in the secondary term.101
In 1994, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,
which provides a clear example of its application of the “capability rule.”102  In
Pack, the lessors claimed their leases with Santa Fe Minerals had terminated
due to the wells’ failure to produce during a sixty-day period and the lessee’s
failure to commence drilling operations or pay shut-in royalty payments, in
violation of express terms of the lease.103  Relevant to the court’s analysis was
its discussion of habendum clause interpretation.104  The court quickly
determined the leases had been extended beyond the primary term “due to the
wells’ capability to produce in paying or commercial quantities.”105  The court
relied on stipulated facts that indicated the wells were capable of producing in
paying quantities through the time of trial, even though the lessee had chosen
not to market gas from the wells for longer than sixty days because of natural
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demand and price fluctuations in the market.106  The court noted this was
common practice because of allowable limitations on production imposed by
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.107  The court held that “when a lease
has the capability to produce and hydrocarbons have been reduced to the
capture and control of the lessee, a lease cannot be terminated.”108  Thus, the
court preserved the rule that “the lease in the case at bar cannot terminate under
the terms of the habendum clause because the parties stipulated that the subject
wells were at all times capable of producing in paying quantities.”109
Although the court provided “much needed clarification of its perspective on
mineral lease terminations,” it nevertheless failed to precisely define what
“capability to produce” means.110  In Pack, the court clarified that the
requirement of “capability of production” and the requirement imposed by the
implied covenant to market were separate.111  As a result, the “capability rule”
in Oklahoma does not require marketing, but the separate doctrine of the
implied covenant to market does require the operator to seek a market with due
diligence.112  
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals applied Pack in Danne v. Texaco
Exploration and Production, Inc.113  In Danne, the court held capability of
production satisfies the habendum clause in the secondary term, but
continuation of the lease is also subject to other implied covenants.114  The court
found the lease could not automatically terminate in the secondary term because
“the lessee has proved a valuable asset and has established a right to develop
that asset.”115  The lessor, however, could seek forfeiture of the lease if other
implied covenants, such as the implied covenant to market, were not satisfied.116
Thus, Oklahoma’s separation allows for incorporation of the more relaxed view
of the implied covenant to market, simply requiring “market[ing] the product
with due diligence,” or “a significant attempt to market the product.”117  In
contrast, Texas’ “actual production” rule, merges the requirements of satisfying
the habendum clause and the requirements of the implied covenant to market.118
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After considering these Oklahoma decisions interpreting habendum clauses,
certain trends are discernable, forming the “Oklahoma lens” through which
Thompson may be analyzed.  First, these cases show that the “capability rule”
has wide application in Oklahoma.  It applies not only to the determination of
what extends the lease beyond the primary term, but also applies to extension
of the lease within the secondary term.  In Pack, as will be analyzed in Part IV,
the application of the rule was further extended to interpreting cessation-of-
production clauses.119  This only makes the question of what “capability” means
more significant.  Second, it may be gleaned from this authority that Oklahoma
has a general policy disfavoring the forfeiture of interests.120  Consequently,
“courts avoid the effect of forfeiture by giving due consideration to compelling
equitable circumstances.”121  Therefore, reasonable circumstances likely will be
influential to an Oklahoma court when determining whether a particular well
is “capable” of producing in paying quantities.  Finally, the distinction between
the requirements of the habendum clause and the implied covenant to market
may be indicative of the type of “capability” a well must exhibit in Oklahoma
to satisfy the “capability rule” (simply capable of production or capable of
marketing as well).  Thompson will be analyzed through this lens to determine
how Oklahoma courts should construe “capability” in future cases.
III. Statement of the Case—Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson
A. Facts and Issues of the Case
The facts of the Thompson case are relatively simple—they involve the
interpretation of a lease written sixty-six years before the Texas Supreme Court
endeavored to construe its provisions.122  In 1936, the mineral owners, Phillip
Thompson’s predecessors in interest, executed an oil and gas lease as lessors
with Anadarko’s predecessor in interest as lessee.123  The lease contained an
atypical habendum clause reading, “This lease shall remain in force for a term
of one (1) year and as long thereafter as gas is or can be produced.”124  Also
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94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
133. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis added).
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included in the lease was a cessation-of-production clause.125  The purpose of
this clause was to keep the lease alive after the expiration of the primary term,
stating that if production on the leased land ceased for any reason, but the lessee
resumed drilling operations within sixty days of the cessation, the lease would
remain alive as if production never halted.126  The litigation centered on the
apparent contradiction between these two clauses.
Because gas production commenced in 1936, the year the lease was signed,
the lease extended beyond its primary term.127  However, while pipeline repairs
were conducted by the gas purchaser, production completely ceased for sixty-
one days in 1981 and for ninety-one days in 1985.128
Thompson sued in 1997, requesting a declaration from the District Court of
Moore County, Texas129 that the lease terminated in 1981 when production
ceased and seeking to recover conversion damages.130  The trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Thompson and held the lease had
terminated because of the cessation-in-production in excess of sixty days; the
court awarded him damages and attorney’s fees.131  Anadarko appealed,
contending the trial court erred in holding that the cessation-of-production
terminated the lease.132
The dispute in Thompson primarily concerned the parties’ different
interpretations of the lease’s habendum clause and its language stating the lease
would be maintained as long as oil or gas “is or can be produced.”133  Anadarko
argued the “can be produced” language in the habendum clause of the lease
should be interpreted literally; therefore, because the well was at all times
“capable” of producing in paying quantities, the lease survived.134  Anadarko’s
argument maintained that the “capability rule,” as established in Oklahoma,135
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original).
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was written into the lease and should be given effect.136  In opposition,
Thompson urged the court to apply the “actual production rule” in interpreting
the habendum clause, despite the inclusion of the “can be” language.137
Because actual production ceased for over sixty days, Thompson thought the
lease had expired.138  The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held in favor of
Thompson, rejecting the “capability rule” even when confronted by the “can be
produced” contractual language.139  Although it acknowledged that a literal
interpretation of the habendum clause would extend the lease if the well were
capable of producing gas in paying quantities, the court flatly rejected a literal
construction.140  
In lieu of a literal construction, the appellate court relied upon the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. King where the controversy concerned
the omission of the qualifier “in paying quantities” from the “is produced”
language in a habendum clause.141  In Garcia, the Texas Supreme Court noted
that a literal reading omitted “in paying quantities,” but considered that the
intent of the parties was “to secure development of the property for the mutual
[economic] benefit of the parties.”142  Therefore, the court reasoned, “produced”
necessarily meant “production in paying quantities.”143  
The appellate court in Thompson derived two rules from Garcia to apply to
the Thompson dispute:
The first . . . pertains to the need to construe mineral leases in
accordance with the objectives of the parties. . . . The second rule
compelled by Garcia involves the objectives or intent attributable
to those entering such agreements.  One of them is the intent to reap
economic benefit from the development of the property.  And,
unless the agreement readily illustrates the purpose to be something
else, we must construe the document and its words in a way
fulfilling that purpose.144
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153. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
The Thompson court—drawing upon the implicit purpose of all oil and gas
leases, as stated in Garcia, to seek the “mutual [economic] benefit of the
parties”—determined the effect of the “can be” language in the Thompson
habendum clause.145  This implicit purpose of economic benefit was the primary
reason the Texas Court of Civil Appeals rejected a literal interpretation of the
habendum clause.146  The appellate court reasoned that if only “capability” was
required, the lessee could fail to develop the land but continue to maintain the
lease by simply establishing that gas could be produced in paying quantities.147
In that case, the lessee would be allowed to hold a lease for improper
speculative purposes.  This possibility prompted the court’s holding that “the
goal legally implicit and factually explicit in [the] lease would be thwarted if
‘can be produced’ meant nothing more than ‘physical ability’ to draw gas in
paying quantities.”148
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals concluded the cessation-of-
production clause would be rendered useless if only capability was required to
hold the lease.149  The court rhetorically asked, “Why should there be any
reason to mention the need to resume drilling operations and, thereby, pursue
actual production to maintain the lease if the only thing that was required was
the mere ability to produce?”150  Because no sound reason existed for inclusion
of the cessation-of-production clause if the “capability rule” applied, the court
reinforced its decision requiring actual production to satisfy the habendum
clause.151  In so holding, the court cited precedent from other states, including
Oklahoma, for finding that a cessation-of-production clause is rendered useless
by allowing capability of production to maintain a lease in the secondary
term.152  Anadarko appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.153
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B. Decision and Rationale of the Texas Supreme Court in Thompson
The Texas Supreme Court began their analysis by laying the foundation for
how oil and gas lease terms, including the habendum clause, should be
construed.154  The court maintained that the plain grammatical meaning of a
term should control unless it defeats the parties’ intentions.155  Next, the court
acknowledged the basic rule in Texas that “actual production in paying
quantities” is required to satisfy the language in the habendum clause of an oil
and gas lease which states that the lease continues “as long thereafter as oil, gas
or other mineral is produced.”156  The habendum clause in this case, however,
presented the court with the atypical “is or can be produced” language in
tandem with a sixty-day cessation-of-production clause.157
In holding that actual production was not necessary to maintain the lease, the
Texas Supreme Court carefully distinguished the uncommon habendum clause
in Thompson with those typically found in oil and gas leases.158  The court
determined that because neither party contended the lease term was ambiguous,
the parties’ intent should first be resolved by considering the language within
the four corners of the lease.159  Holding that the “actual production” rule
continued to apply to “is produced” habendum clause language, and thus
upholding their precedent in Reid160 and Garcia,161 the court further held that the
“actual production” rule did not necessarily apply to the atypical “is or can be
produced” language in the Thompson lease.162  Instead the court found that
“[t]he habendum clause’s plain language shows that the parties intended that a
well actually produce gas, or be capable of producing gas, to sustain the lease”;
thus, the plain meaning of the words was found to be expressive of the parties’
intent.163
The Texas Supreme Court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ idea that the
cessation-of-production clause would be rendered useless by giving effect to the
“can be produced” language so that capability of production continues the
lease.164  Quite similarly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s application of the
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“capability rule” in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,165 the Texas Supreme Court
found that in this case, “the cessation-of-production clause only applies if a well
holding the lease ceases to be capable of producing gas.”166  According to the
court, “[c]onstruing the cessation-of-production clause to apply when a well
holding the lease ceases to be capable of production—and not simply when
actual production ceases—accords with the cessation-of-production clause’s
plain language.”167
To this point in its analysis, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the “can
be produced” language in the Thompson lease just as an Oklahoma court would
interpret “is produced” or “can be produced” language in a habendum clause.168
The opinion, however, did not stop with this construction; the court went
further, expressly defining what “capability” means with regard to such lease
terms in Texas.169  The court adopted the definition of “capable” proffered by
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker
Exploration, Inc.,170 which determined whether the lessee’s payment of shut-in
royalties maintained the lease despite the fact that actual production had
ceased.171  According to the Hydrocarbon court’s definition, “capable” means
a well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is turned
“on,” and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or repair.
Conversely, a well would not be capable of producing in paying
quantities if the well switch were turned “on,” and the well did not
flow, because of mechanical problems or because the well needs
rods, tubing, or pumping equipment.172
Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court found this definition “consistent with
existing cases that discuss the difference between actual production and
capability of production.”173  Therefore, the Thompson lease did not terminate
because the wells were found to be at all times capable of producing in paying
quantities without additional equipment or repair, and the wells were actually
connected to a pipeline facility.174
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Thompson’s motion for rehearing was denied.175  However, the Texas
Supreme Court wrote a per curiam opinion to clarify its previously issued
opinion, primarily discussing the retention of the longstanding definition of
“paying quantities” and the interplay of marketing requirements with capability
under their decision in Thompson.176  Although intended to clarify the original
opinion, the per curiam decision further confused the issue.  That opinion began
by stating:
[W]e did not overrule or modify the longstanding requirement that
for a well to produce in paying quantities, or to be capable of
producing in paying quantities, there must be facilities located near
enough to the well that it would be economically feasible to
establish a connection so that production could be marketed at a
profit.177
This raises the question of whether the Texas Supreme Court held that a well
must be capable of marketing the product to be capable of producing in paying
quantities, which the Thompson court seems to answer in the affirmative.  It has
been established that the “actual production” rule in Texas requires marketing
as well as production, merging the concepts of the implied covenant to market
and the habendum clause.178  Thompson, however, incorporates a marketing
requirement into the “capability rule” when it is made applicable by relevant
lease language.
Despite the fact that the court proceeded to carefully distinguish between a
breach of an implied covenant and a failure to satisfy the habendum clause, the
court’s language merged the concepts.  The court stated that they “did not
intend to imply that the remedy for breach of an implied covenant to market
production would be forfeiture or termination of a lease,” but rather maintained
the rule that the breaching party is subject to “liability for monetary
damages.”179  However, the court then stated:
We meant in our original decision that, as a practical matter, a lessee
will not sustain a lease based on a well’s capability of production
without actual production of the well because the payment of
damages for the failure to reasonably market the gas would be a
strong incentive to connect the well to facilities that would permit
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actual production.  And, in an extraordinary case, when damages
would not furnish an adequate remedy, a court could conditionally
order termination if a connection and actual production were not
commenced within a reasonable time.180
The court clearly was aware that the consequence of its language would be to
require the capability of marketing to maintain the lease.181
In its original opinion, the court accepted the idea that capability was written
into the lease language, and thus decided to forego application of the “actual
production” rule to give full-effect to that language and the parties’ intent.182
However, the after-the-fact per curiam opinion, written upon the denial of the
motion for rehearing, shows that the departure from the “actual production” rule
is not as pronounced as the original opinion seemed to suggest.  First, the court
required that for a well to be capable, it must not need any additional equipment
or repairs before it begins to flow.183  Furthermore, the court suggested in its
additional opinion that—although only damages are available for breach of the
implied covenant to market—it is a virtual impossibility to sustain a lease
without actual production and marketing because of the impending threat of
substantial monetary damages.184  The application of the “capability rule” in
Thompson should be approached with caution by Oklahoma courts because it
neither translates to Oklahoma’s liberal application of the rule185 nor comports
with Oklahoma’s goal of avoiding the forfeiture of property interests.186
C. Application of the Thompson “Capability Rule” in Chesapeake
Exploration Limited Partnership v. Corine, Inc.
Texas courts have showed no sign of retreat from their strict interpretation
of “capability” announced in Thompson. In 2007, the Texas Court of Appeals
strictly applied the Thompson rule in Chesapeake Exploration Ltd. Partnership
v. Corine, Inc.187  In Corine, the lease language provided that the lease
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terminated if, at the end of the primary term, the well was not capable of
producing in paying quantities.188  The court cited the Thompson rule: “A well
is capable of production if it is capable of producing in paying quantities
without additional equipment or repairs.”189  The lessor, Corine, introduced
evidence showing that the well on the leased premises “was not equipped with
rods, tubing, or pumping equipment when the primary term of the lease
ended.”190  Corine then filed for partial summary judgment on the grounds that
the well was not capable of producing in paying quantities; the trial court
granted his motion, which was affirmed on appeal.191
Chesapeake admitted the well needed this equipment before it would “turn
on” and attached an affidavit to its response to the motion for summary
judgment to explain the well’s minor engineering situation.192 Instead of hearing
a practical explanation, the court “struck all of the attempts to explain” because
the fact that additional equipment was needed, in combination with the strict
Thompson “capability rule,” left nothing to resolve.193  The trial court
interpreted the Texas Supreme Court’s rule from Thompson as a severe
mandate and terminated the lease of a lessee who had diligently sought
production and heavily invested in a project.194
IV. The Thompson “Capability Rule” Is Not Congruent with Oklahoma
Jurisprudence Interpreting the Habendum Clauses of Oil and Gas Leases
In Texas, where actual production is the default rule for the typical “is
produced” habendum clause language,195 parties insert “can be produced”
language to avoid the strict requirements of the “actual production” rule.196  The
“capability rule,” as applied by the Texas Supreme Court in Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson,197 does not comport with the intent of the parties
when capability is written into a lease.  If Oklahoma courts were to define
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“capability” as the Texas Supreme Court has done—or in a similar way—the
results would be even more far-reaching.  As previously discussed, Oklahoma
applies the “capability rule” in all circumstances, including when “is produced”
language is present in the lease, but no clear definition of “capable” has been
offered.198  Therefore, a definition similar to that given in Thompson would be
especially burdensome to the Oklahoma oil and gas industry.
This section will focus on the practical frustrations such a definition would
cause for operators from an engineering standpoint and the associated danger
of forfeiture, the implications on the implied covenant to market, and the
definition’s relationship with Oklahoma’s application of the common law
doctrine of temporary cessation or cessation-of-production clauses.
A. The Thompson Definition of “Capable” is Incompatible with Engineering
Realities
The strict definition of “capable” adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in
Thompson would not be a practical rule to apply generally in Oklahoma to
interpret habendum clauses primarily because it is untenable with engineering
realities.199  As stated previously, the court in Thompson borrowed the
definition of “capable” from an earlier Texas case, which defines a capable well
as:
[A] well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is turned
“on,” and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or repair.
Conversely, a well would not be capable of producing in paying
quantities if the well switch were turned “on,” and the well did not
flow, because of mechanical problems or because the well needs
rods, tubing, or pumping equipment.200
The first question that necessarily arises from this seemingly simplistic
definition is, “What is this magic switch?”
Oil and gas wells are a complex set of working parts, and the Texas Supreme
Court’s definition seems to indicate that failure of any one of these, no matter
how minor or repairable, causes the entire lease to be cancelled.  As one
experienced petroleum engineer has stated:
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The language adopted by the Texas Supreme Court indicates that
“turning on a well” is like throwing a light switch in your bathroom.
Very rarely it may be that simple, but usually it is more akin to
getting your entertainment center working, requiring manipulation
of several different devices to achieve the desired outcome.  This
could involve opening numerous valves, setting choke sizes,
separators, compressors, heater treaters, dehydration units, line
heaters, and other devices.201
The Thompson “capability rule” suggests that if there were a failure at any of
the several points in this complex chain, the well would be declared incapable.
This would mean in this most exceptional case that something as simple as a
blown fuse on a shut-in well could render a well incapable absent a relevant
savings clause or a favorable application of the doctrine of temporary cessation.
There are also common difficulties in actually producing oil or gas that can
be, and often are, remedied though mechanical processes.202  The Thompson
definition indicates that simply the necessity of such processes would render a
well incapable.203  For example, gas wells usually produce some amount of
liquid water and/or condensate during their normal production cycle.204  During
a shut-in period, the gas and liquid segregate with the gas on top, then a layer
of condensate, and the water at the bottom of the well.205  If an abundance of
water is in the well, the gas is prevented from entering the well bore, and the
flow of gas cannot be sustained.206  If this were the case, the well would not be
able to immediately flow after being “turned on.”207  However, an operator
commonly “swabs” the well to lift liquid from the hole, removing hydrostatic
pressure and allowing the well to flow.208  Under Thompson, the necessity of
swabbing would make the well “incapable,” but after a normal swabbing
process, an economically profitable well may resume flowing.209  If such a well
were deemed incapable and the lease were lost, the operator would suffer a
considerable forfeiture of time and resources.
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Often, gas wells are shut-in to await a market or pipeline in the area.210  The
pipelines, which are routed through a given geographic location, have specific
pressure requirements that necessitate specialized equipment on gas wells.211
For example, if a gas well’s pressure is lower than the line’s required pressure,
a piece of equipment known as a compressor must be attached so the gas may
be transported through the pipeline and marketed.212  On the other hand, if the
well’s pressure is higher than the line’s threshold, equipment will be attached
to the well to regulate the pressure.213  Under either scenario, these devices
cannot be determined necessary or properly sized without knowing the pipeline
requirements.214  Such requirements may not be known for a considerable
amount of time in some circumstances.215
Therefore, while the well is shut-in, it might not immediately flow because
the proper equipment is not attached and the pipeline connection has yet to be
established.  In Thompson, the Texas Supreme Court suggests capability of
marketing is also required for a well to be capable of producing.216  Therefore,
simply the lack of pipeline connection will be enough to declare the well
“incapable.”  In contrast, Oklahoma courts have maintained that the implied
covenant to market and satisfying the habendum clause are two separate
requirements.217  Thus, it seems unlikely that Oklahoma courts would declare
a well incapable for lack of a pipeline connection.  However, if the Texas view
were adopted, it is possible that lack of other equipment to regulate the pressure
would be enough to declare a well incapable.  This is completely beyond the
operator’s control, and such a result would be highly inequitable considering
the operator’s substantial investment in drilling the well.
The strict requirements of capability adopted by the Texas Supreme Court
are neither practical nor equitable.  Oil and gas companies invest hundreds of
thousands of dollars drilling wells, and it is clearly in the operator’s best interest
to have a well “capable” of producing in paying quantities.  However, if they
have taken all the necessary steps to develop a well except one component that
is out of their control, such as gaining access to a pipeline or power source or
procuring a government easement or permit, the operator may choose to wait
before adding expensive additional equipment that would be determinative in
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finding a well “capable” of production.218  As noted, this may be the case simply
because they do not have the pipeline requirements.219  Furthermore, they may
not want to add additional equipment to sit idle in the field while the well is
shut-in at the risk of weathering and exposure to theft.220  Therefore, an operator
may take certain actions that will cause their well to be incapable because they
believe it is in the lessor’s and lessee’s best cooperative interest to do so.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that the definition of “produced”
would not extend beyond what is reasonable for the oil and gas industry.221  A
strict definition akin to that used in Thompson would violate this principle.
Furthermore, Oklahoma has a general policy disfavoring the forfeiture of
interests and “courts avoid the effect of forfeiture by giving due consideration
to compelling equitable circumstances.”222  The Oklahoma “capability rule” is
an important way the courts consider the equitable posture of the lessee/lessor
relationship and its version of the rule should be maintained to its fullest extent.
The Texas “capability” interpretation disregards both the practicalities of the oil
and gas industry and leads to inequitable results for operators.  Therefore, it has
no place in Oklahoma’s jurisprudence interpreting the “capability rule.”
B. The Thompson Definition of “Capable” Confuses the Requirements of
Satisfying the Habendum Clause with the Implied Covenant to Market
With regard to oil and gas leases, there is an implied covenant to market,
which includes the operator’s duty to market within a reasonable time, at a
reasonable price.223  As discussed in Part III.B, the interpretation of the
“capability rule” in Thompson merges the concepts of satisfying the habendum
clause and satisfying the implied covenant to market, even though the opinion
insists the distinction remains.224 Though the Texas Supreme Court stated it did
not intend to merge the concepts, it acknowledged that the effect nevertheless
occurs due to its strict “capability rule.”225  On the other hand, Oklahoma courts
have made it clear that these two principles have separate requirements.226  If
Oklahoma were to adopt the Texas construction, satisfaction of the implied
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covenant to market and the habendum clause would also be unintentionally
merged—an unfortunate result for Oklahoma’s vital oil and gas industry.
An operator should have a reasonable amount of time after a well is
established to procure a market for their product.  If they fail to do so, damages
are the proper remedy for breach of the implied covenant to market rather than
termination of the lease, which would result in forfeiture of a tremendous
investment.  Primarily, the difficulty with marketing involves gas wells.
Because natural gas, unlike oil, cannot be stored, it must immediately be
diverted into a pipeline to reach its market.  Because a capable gas well is often
shut-in to await a market, or pipeline, in the geographic area, requiring the
capability of marketing to sustain a lease is a substantial burden on an operator
attempting to establish a natural gas production field.  This discourages new
frontier exploration by oil and gas companies.  For example, the Barnett and
Woodford shale areas offer unconventional resources often unassociated with
traditional production and without immediate access to a pipeline connection.227
Also, because no single well would likely be prolific enough to justify the
needed construction on its own merit, these types of areas would require drilling
numerous wells to establish the necessary resource base and justify construction
of pipelines and other surface facilities such as central delivery points, gas
treatment plants, and water disposal facilities.228  “It becomes a “chicken and
egg” problem.  Nobody will invest in the surface facilities until enough wells
have been drilled, but you can’t afford to drill the wells because your leases
may expire before the facilities are completed.”229
For these reasons and to encourage new development, the requirement of
marketing and the requirement of capability of production in paying quantities
should remain separate inquiries for the court.  Considering the decisions in
Pack230 and Danne,231 it is clear Oklahoma courts do not read any marketing
requirement into the “capability rule.”
C. The Oklahoma Court’s Application of the Common Law Doctrine of
Temporary Cessation Conflicts with Texas’ “Capability Rule”
In many oil and gas leases, the parties obviously contemplate interruptions
in production on the leased premises and write cessation-of-production clauses
into the lease to save it if production temporarily ceases.232  These clauses serve
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to “save” the lease by setting a time period, usually sixty days, where
production may be discontinued.  As was held in Pack by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and in Thompson by the Texas Supreme Court, the definition
of “production” for the purposes of interpreting a cessation-of-production
clause is the same as the definition of “production” used to satisfy the
habendum clause.  Therefore, if capability of production satisfies the habendum
clause, the “clock” does not begin running on the cessation-of-production time
limit until a well ceases to be capable of producing.
The strict Thompson definition of “capability” will, therefore, also impact the
interpretation of cessation-of-production clauses.  Under the Texas Supreme
Court’s logic, though the purpose of a cessation-of-production clause is to save
a lease, if a well is incapable of production solely because it needs any sort of
equipment or repair, the sixty day clock would begin to run.  A brief
hypothetical serves to illustrate this point:  if a simple fuse is blown on a well
and it cannot be repaired for sixty days (or the relevant period) because of
weather conditions, lack of an appropriate part to repair the fuse, or lack of
knowledge of the problem, the lease would be terminated.  Such extreme
illustrations may be the exception rather than the rule, but the effect remains
that a diligent operator may lose a potentially profitable lease because of a strict
interpretation of the term “capable”—a term meant to have a liberal effect.
When no cessation-of-production clause is present in the lease, courts
generally apply the doctrine of temporary cessation.  This common law doctrine
also serves to save the lease because production interruptions are foreseeable.
“Oklahoma has adopted the common law doctrine of temporary cessation-of-
production which provides an oil and gas lease will continue in force during the
secondary term unless the period of cessation, viewed in light of all the
circumstances is for an unreasonable time.”233  Whether or not this doctrine will
serve to save a lease generally depends on three factors: the period over which
cessation extends, the cause of termination, and the lessee’s efforts to restore
production.  Therefore, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case,
the doctrine may serve to maintain a lease where it is equitable to do so.
Jurisdictions such as Oklahoma applying this doctrine “note that the lessee
makes a very substantial investment and bears the entire loss if the well is
unproductive, so it is harsh and inequitable to allow the lessor, on a temporary
cessation of production, to declare forfeiture and take over the property himself
or herself.”234  The Texas view of capability of production subverts this effect.
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As previous examples have shown, forfeiture results from the strict
interpretation of “capable” and leases are lost for relatively minor reasons.  The
doctrine of temporary cessation supports looking to equitable considerations to
determine if a well is capable of producing in paying quantities, even if modest
work is needed before the well actually produces.
V. Conclusion
Oklahoma’s “capability rule” offers oil and gas companies who undertake
risky exploration and costly drilling activities an avenue to maintain their
leases, which furthers State policy by disfavoring forfeiture of interests and
maintaining equity among lessor and lessee.  The strict interpretation of
“capable” adopted by the Texas Supreme Court leads to inequitable
consequences.  Although the results of the rule are less dramatic in Texas
because of the generally applicable “actual production” rule in the state, when
Oklahoma courts are forced to more explicitly define “capability,” equitable
considerations should remain the primary consideration.  Therefore, the strict
Texas construction of “capable” has no place in Oklahoma law interpreting oil
and gas leases.
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